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1. First let me note a couple of minor errors that Hetherington makes 
in reporting or interpreting what I say:
(a) In note 2 Hetherington speaks of “Ginet’s discussion of sentences 
whose meaning ‘does not vary from one context of utterance to 
another’.” Actually, I discuss, and restrict my initial definition of 
self-evidence to, sentences whose meaning is such that what 
they say does not vary from one context to another. The excluded 
sentences, ones whose meaning is such that what they say does 
vary from one context to another (e.g., “I hiked four miles this 
morning”), would not be excluded by H’s characterization because 
their meaning does not vary, only what they say. The variation in 
what they say follows from their unvarying meaning: it is part 
of the unvarying meaning of the first person pronoun “I” that it 
refers to the person uttering it.
(b) In note 5 he points out that if my definition of self-evidence had 
the form ‘p is self-evident iff, for any S, if S fully understands what 
p says, then S believes….’ and the conditional is construed as a 
material conditional, then we would have the unfortunate result 
that any sentence that no one understands is self-evident. But, 
of course, I meant the relevant conditional to be construed as an 
entailment (not a material conditional). I had thought I was making 
that clear by phrasing the relevant part of (D1-prelim) as follows: 
“if S understands what the sentence p says then it follows that S 
believes…”; and the relevant part of (D1) this way: “anyone who 
fully understands what they would say by uttering the sentence   
p must either…” (emphases added).
*  See Stephen Hetherington, Ginet on a priori Knowledge: Skills and Grades, in: Veritas, 
54, 2 (2010), p. 32-40.
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Now on to more substantive matters.
2. Hetherington says:
“He [Ginet] will not intend full understanding, I take it, to be either a 
priori knowledge-that (on pain of circularity in the analysis) or a posteriori 
knowledge-that (on pain of no longer analyzing a priori knowledge as 
such).”1
Actually, I do opt for the second alternative here: I take fully 
understanding what a sentence says to involve a posteriori knowledge 
about that sentence (as Comesaña notes in his comments). In note 3 of 
my paper2 I say that ‘S understands what p says’ entails that S knows 
some truth of the form ‘What p says is that r’, and the latter is clearly a 
contingent truth about a particular language that could be known only a 
posteriori.  But I don’t think this means that I am “no longer analyzing a 
priori knowledge as such.” As I say in the paper, and again in my reply to 
Comesaña, for the case where fully understanding what a sentence says 
entails believing what it says, the way in which the full understanding 
of what the sentence says is involved in the subject’s having (non-
inferential) justification for believing it is not such as to give us reason to 
regard that justification as other than a priori. If this were not so, then it 
would be impossible to know a priori, e.g., that a rhombus is a Euclidean 
plane figure with four equal sides. Knowing this requires understanding 
the proposition that a rhombus is a Euclidean plane figure with four equal 
sides, and no one could understand that proposition who understood no 
sentence p that expresses that proposition.
3. Hetherington  suggests  that  what  I  mean  by  application-
competence with respect to a descriptive term is a kind of knowing-
how. This is obviously right: it is knowing how to apply and withhold 
the term correctly. And since (on my account) fully understanding what 
a sentence says involves having application-competence with respect 
to its descriptive terms, it too is, or involves, a kind of knowing-how. 
But, contrary to what Hetherington seems to think, this move does not 
avoid supposing that application competence and full understanding 
involve a posteriori knowledge. For the kind of knowing-how involved 
here is also a kind of knowing-that. This is quite obvious with respect to 
application competence for a descriptive term d: it is knowing which sorts 
of cases d applies to and which sorts it does not apply to (and perhaps   
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which sorts are unclear cases). And, as I’ve said, understanding what a 
sentence p says requires knowing some truth of the form ‘What p says 
is that r’. (I am inclined to think that in general knowing-how reduces to 
knowing-that: knowing how to… is knowing to be true propositions that 
give a satisfactory answer to the question ‘How does one…?’ or ‘How 
should/may one…?’3 In note 18 of his comments Hetherington says that 
elsewhere he argues that “any instance of knowledge-that is an instance 
of a kind of knowledge-how.” For all I know, this claim may be right. If it 
is, and my claim that any instance of knowledge-how is an instance of 
knowledge-that is right, then knowledge-how and knowledge-that are 
necessarily co-extensive.)
4. Hetherington suggests that construing a priori knowledge as 
some complex knowing-how (perhaps involving various other sorts of 
know-how besides application-competence with respect to descriptive 
terms) “allows us to bypass what is usually the initial move within the 
metaphysics of knowledge — whereby any case of knowledge is assumed 
to be, for a start, a belief or something similar.” He suggests this because 
he thinks that knowledge-how is not any sort of knowledge-that and 
therefore does not entail any belief-that. But if, as seems clear to me, 
the knowledge-how involved in a priori knowledge is in fact a sort of 
knowledge-that, then this way of making it out that this knowledge-how 
is not a species of belief-that is blocked.
5. Hetherington suggests that, if we suppose that my account of a 
priori knowledge (by self-evidence) is best construed as making it a kind 
of knowledge-how, then my account gives “some unwitting support for 
a conception of knowledge as able to admit of degrees or grades.” The 
support would indeed be unwitting. In fact I don’t think that anything 
I say in my paper commits me either to the proposition that knowledge 
admits of degrees or to the proposition that it doesn’t.  I’m quite willing 
to entertain the idea that it does, but of course how acceptable I would 
find it depends on just how it is explained.
Hetherington says that by “knowledge gradualism” he means “the 
thesis that a particular p could itself be known in various ways, ones that 
are more or less good, purely qua knowledge that p.” There is at least one 
way in which I can understand this thesis and in which it strikes me as 
correct. One’s knowledge that p might be more or less good according   
as one’s justification for believing that p is more or less vulnerable to   
 
3  For argument in favor of this view see Ginet 1975, pp. 6-9, and Stanley and Williamson 
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being wrong. For example, your knowledge that there was a bison in the 
backyard this morning, based on your having seen one there, is better 
than my knowledge of that fact based only on your telling me that you 
saw one there. Your justification could have been justification for a false 
belief as a result of your visual experience somehow misrepresenting 
things. My justification could have been justification for false belief as a 
result of your visual experience misrepresenting things, or as a result of 
your misspeaking when you told me what you saw, or as a result of my 
misunderstanding what you said. There are fewer ways things could have 
gone wrong in the process leading to your justified belief than they could 
have in the process leading to mine, for the ways things could have gone 
wrong in the latter case include those in the former case and a few more. 
This illustrates one sort of basis on which justifications might be ranked 
better or worse, but there are no doubt others we could think of.
6. But this does not seem to be the sort of thing Hetherington has 
in mind in speaking of grades of knowledge, better and worse ways 
of knowing that p. He links his understanding of this to his idea that 
knowledge-that is knowledge-how, that knowing that p is a complex of 
abilities relating to the proposition that p. He doesn’t try to spell this out for 
the general case. But he considers the special case of a priori knowledge 
that p by its being self-evident to one that p and thinks that, using my 
account of such knowledge, we can get degrees of it from supposing 
that there are degrees of understanding what a sentence p says and 
that these are reflected in degrees of belief that p. What he says leaves 
me uncertain that anything helpful will emerge from this line of thought.
There can, of course, be degrees of understanding what a sentence 
says. If A has application-competence for the term “rhombus” but B knows 
only that it applies to some sort of quadrilateral figure, then A understands 
better what is said by “Every rhombus is a quadrilateral” than does B: 
A understands it fully but B does not. And for a sentence like that one, 
which will be self-evident to anyone who fully understands it, there may 
be something to H’s remark, “I can correctly say of myself, ‘I believe 
reasonably strongly that p,’ while recognizing that my tentativeness 
reflects my understanding only reasonably well what p says.” This 
disagrees with something I imply in my paper, namely, that if B said, 
“I believe that a rhombus is a quadrilateral” – rather than “I believe 
that what the sentence ‘Every rhombus is a quadrilateral’ says is true” 
– he would imply that he does fully understand that sentence. I’m still 
inclined to think I’m right on this, but I admit that by saying, “I believe 
that every rhombus is a quadrilateral”, B might convey that he does not 
fully understand the sentence “Every rhombus is a quadrilateral”; since C. Ginet – Reply to Hetherington
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to anyone who does fully understand the term “rhombus” it would be 
self-evident that a rhombus is a quadrilateral and he would not say merely 
that he believes that it is, which suggests a certain hesitancy about 
the commitment. But the implication of shaky understanding would be 
pragmatic, a conversational implicature, and not entailed by what the 
sentence “I believe that every rhombus is a quadrilateral” says.
But Hetherington appears to think that degrees of belief reflect or 
manifest degrees of understanding in a more general and more direct 
way. I infer this from the suggestions he makes about revising my 
definitions (D1) and (D2) and my claims (J) and (K). His revision of (D1), 
for instance, is this:
“It is self-evident to degree d that p if and only if anyone who 
understands to degree d what they would say by uttering the sentence p 
must either (i) believe to degree d what they would thereby say, namely 
that p, or (ii) believe to degree d that they have reason to believe, to at 
least degree d, that what they would thereby say is incoherent.”4
But I don’t see that degree or strength of belief (as we ordinarily 
understand that notion) does generally reflect degree of understanding 
of what is believed, or correlate with it in a way that would make sense 
of H’s revisions of my definitions. B may know that the term “rhombus” 
applies to some sort of quadrilateral but not know precisely which sort. B 
may therefore believe quite as strongly as A that what is said by “Every 
rhombus is a quadrilateral” is true, even though B does not understand 
what is said by that sentence as well as A does and B recognizes that 
he does not fully understand it. On the other hand, consider a non-
self-evident sentence like “If X is a locally compact topological space 
which is either Hausdorff or regular, then the family of closed compact 
neighborhoods of each point is a base for its neighborhood system”. 
We can imagine a situation in which B does not understand what that 
sentence says but nevertheless knows and is quite confident that what 
it says is true, because he has seen it labeled THEOREM in a topology 
textbook; but A, who has studied topology enough to fully understand 
what that sentence says but has not yet seen it proved or been told that 
it is a theorem, believes at most only very weakly that what it says is   
a theorem. Here B is much weaker in understanding than A but a lot 
stronger than A in believing.
I don’t see that degree of understanding and degree of belief go 
together in the way that would seem to be required to make sense of   
H’s revisions of my definitions and claims. So I don’t know what to make 
of them.
4  Id. ibid., p. 38-39.C. Ginet – Reply to Hetherington
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